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FREEDOM OF JOURNALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
EDWARD L. CARTER*
ROSALIE WESTENSKOW**

Contemporary attacks of various types have prompted calls for stronger public
support and legal protections for journalism. Around the world, journalism faces
not only government regulation that affects editorial content but also economic
and corporate pressures as well as lack of public understanding of its societal
functions. In the United States, courts and even journalism organizations have
been reluctant to define journalism or single it out for special protection. But
international human rights law presents a possible solution. This article
discusses the international human rights law provisions that protect individuals
engaged in journalism. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has laid
groundwork to define and protect journalism’s unique functions within the larger
international law framework for freedom of expression. This groundwork
includes the possibility for individual journalism rights to be distinguished from
institutional media or press rights. The article contends that such a distinction
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has become increasingly important. The international law proportionality test
could resolve concerns about defining journalism as a stand-alone fundamental
right.

The gruesome state-ordered torture and murder of Saudi Arabian exile Jamal
Khashoggi on October 2, 2018 serves as a tragic reminder of the lengths to which
autocrats will go to suppress journalism. A group of Saudi agents with close ties to
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman dismembered Khashoggi, a long-time journalist
who commented pointedly on the corruption and failures of both the Crown Prince and
U.S. President Donald J. Trump, inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.1 The
extrajudicial killing was caught on audio recording. Khashoggi, a legal United States
resident, had entered the consulate to obtain a document prior to marrying his fiancée,
Hatice Cengiz. The international legal community condemned the killing, pointedly in
the form of an exhaustive report by United Nations Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard,
who called the Saudis’ action “a deliberate, premeditated execution.”2 Yet, the Trump
administration prevaricated in holding the Saudis to account. Trump himself
acknowledged the billions of dollars flowing from Saudi Arabia to the United States for

1

Annex to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions:

Investigation into the unlawful death of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi, A/HRC/41/CRP.1 (June 19, 2019)
[hereinafter “Khashoggi Report”].
2

Id. at ¶ 235.
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weapons.3 When the Saudis finally admitted that Khashoggi died inside the consulate,
Trump subserviently said he hoped sanctions would not harm the weapons sales.4
Khashoggi’s last column, published posthumously in the Washington Post, was
eerily prescient:

Arab governments have been given free rein to continue silencing the
media at an increasing rate. There was a time when journalists believed
the Internet would liberate information from the censorship and control
associated with print media. But these governments, whose very existence
relies on the control of information, have aggressively blocked the
Internet. They have also arrested local reporters and pressured advertisers
to harm the revenue of specific publications.5

Khashoggi’s proposed solution to this global problem was an internationally
protected network of news media that could deliver outside news beyond the censorship

3

See David D. Kirkparick & Carlotta Gall, Audio Offers Gruesome Details of Jamal Khashoggi

Killing, Turkish Official Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2018, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/europe/turkey-saudi-khashoggi-dismember.html.
4

See Associated Press, Trump Puts Saudi Arms Sales Above Inquiry Into Khashoggi Killing,

PBS.ORG, June 24, 2019, available at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/trump-puts-saudi-arms-salesabove-inquiry-into-khashoggi-killing.
5

Jamal Khashoggi, What the Arab World Needs Most is Free Expression, WASH. POST, Oct. 17,

2018, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/jamal-khashoggi-what-thearab-world-needs-most-is-free-expression/2018/10/17/adfc8c44-d21d-11e8-8c22-fa2ef74bd6d6_story.html.
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of national dictators and could also provide honest assessments of the “poverty,
mismanagement and poor education” in the Arab world.6 Khashoggi believed these
difficult problems could be addressed by Arab populations if only journalists backed by
the international law community could deliver unfettered and frank news accounts. He
concluded, “Through the creation of an independent international forum, isolated from
the influence of nationalist governments spreading hate through propaganda, ordinary
people in the Arab world would be able to address the structural problems their societies
face.”7
The Khashoggi case may be extraordinary for its brutality, but hundreds of
journalists around the world today face attacks on a regular basis. Trump has called
journalists the “enemy of the people” and suggested that his supporters at rallies should
do them harm.8 For Trump, “fake news” constitutes any news he does not like. He has
managed to convince a large swath of the American population that he faces systemic
bias from the news media, and he refuses to acknowledge that journalists could be
actually playing their long-established constitutional and societal role to report on his
corruption, lies, misogyny and racial scapegoating. In the wake of Khashoggi’s death,
Trump complimented a member of Congress from Montana, Greg Gianforte, who

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

See Dan Macguill, Did Donald Trump Encourage Violence at His Rallies?, SNOPES.COM (nd),

https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/donald-trump-incitement-violence/ (accessed January 10, 2020).
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physically attacked a Guardian journalist over campaign coverage in early 2018.9 Trump
is not alone. Journalists around the world face jail time and worse simply for doing their
jobs. Further, vigorous journalism in the public interest is hampered by economic forces
that have led to mass layoffs, corporate consolidation and alignment of politically
partisan institutional media with preferred parties, candidates and office-holders.10
Freedom House’s 2019 study of global free press issues paints a bleak picture.
The report concludes that free press, like democracy worldwide, is in a downward
spiral.11 The NGO reported that elected democratic leaders, including Trump, should be
the staunchest defenders of a free press and yet the opposite is true. The decline of
democracy and free press is especially notable in Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East.
Right-wing populists, the report says, have weaponized “public denunciations of honest
journalists.”12 The goal of these attacks is to undermine public confidence in
journalism’s role to hold government accountable to the people. Assaults on press
independence are correlated with autocratic “power grabs. . . [and] with entrenched
regimes’ attempts to crush perceived threats to their control.”13 Freedom House called
for policymakers around the world to refrain from undermining the role of the press.

9

See Emily Cochrane, “That’s My Kind of Guy,” Trump Says of Republican Lawmaker Who

Body-Slammed a Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2018, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/trump-greg-gianforte-montana.html.
10

See Freedom House, Freedom and the Media: A Downward Spiral,

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-media/freedom-media-2019 (2019).
11
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The global independent news media envisioned by Khashoggi’s final column
would require strong protection under international human rights law. In reality, the
framework for international law press protections already exists, although its presence
sometimes gets obscured amid broader discussion of protections for freedom of
expression. This article asserts that an international law protection for journalism exists
distinctly from broader free-expression and media-freedom rights in the United Nations
Human Rights Committee’s interpretations of Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, known as ICCPR. Given its status as the leading international
human rights law treaty and a key part of what is often called the International Bill of
Rights, ICCPR should be carefully studied and implemented. As with the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s Press Clause, the international human rights law
framework protecting freedom of journalism14 deserves renewed attention and support in
light of a global wave of autocracy, populism and social media-fueled disinformation in
the twenty-first century.
This article contends that international law provides the basis for the function of
journalism, conducted by individuals, to be protected independently of institutional press
or media rights. While this distinction may not always result in a legal difference, it
nonetheless could strengthen public understanding and support of journalism. The article

14

This article uses the phrase “freedom of journalism” in connection with its assertion that an

individual journalism right can and should be distinguished from institutional media or press rights within
international human rights law. Phrases such as “press freedom” are still used in this article when
referencing authors and organizations who have used those phrases, including to indicate both institutional
and individual rights.
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first reviews the state of the Press Clause in the United States, where journalism
traditionally has been protected to an exceptional degree but that protection has been as
an indistinguishable part of broad free-speech rights under the First Amendment.
Journalism in the United States is suffering a decline in public esteem and legal
protection, however.15 Next, the article reviews global scholarly literature discussing the
potential for individual journalism rights to be distinguished from institutional press or
media rights. The article then surveys international human rights law materials for their
definition of the functions and unique characteristics of journalism.

CHALLENGES TO JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
UNDER THE REDUNDANT PRESS CLAUSE

The Supreme Court of the United States has never given independent meaning to
the Press Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution.16 Although the First
Amendment explicitly mentions the press independent of a broad freedom of speech
right, the Court’s decisions in press cases do not rely on the Press Clause.17 One scholar

15

See infra notes 16-62 and accompanying discussion.

16

Justice Potter Stewart argued in a law journal article for recognition of an institutional press

right distinct from the broad free-speech right in the First Amendment, but he did not consider this to be an
individual right of journalists: “The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was a
similar one: to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official
branches.” Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
17

See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (recognizing that

institutional news media may serve “as surrogates for the public” in attending and reporting on criminal
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concluded that the Supreme Court’s tendency to praise the role of journalism in society
while deciding press cases on broad free expression grounds had resulted in much
“pleasant but purposeless dicta.”18 The Court followed this pattern in, among others,
Near v. Minnesota,19 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan20 and New York Times Co. v.
United States.21 Near and the Pentagon Papers case have been viewed as cases about
prior restraint in general, not just press rights, and the protections for “freedoms of
expression” in Sullivan did not depend wholly on the involvement of a newspaper in the
litigation.22 The Supreme Court since the early twentieth century considered “[t]hat
freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character….”23
The Court’s approach may be due in part to the attitude of journalists and their
advocates.24 Sonja West chronicled among journalists and advocates “an aversion to the

court proceedings but stating that journalists “enjoy the same right of access as the public” notwithstanding
“special seating and priority of entry”); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (concluding that
institutional press and broadcast media were not immune from liability for defamation of public officials
and public figures but rather that a balancing test must be undertaken to weigh reputational interests versus
public debate interests); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-61 (1985)
(focusing on the character of statements at issue rather than the media or non-media identity of speakers in
a defamation action).
18

RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705 (2014).

19

283 U.S. 697 (1931).

20

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

21

403 U.S. 713 (1971).

22

376 U.S. at 271.

23

Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).

24

See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011).
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perceived elitism in making the press a select group.”25 Erik Ugland examined eighty
Supreme Court cases involving news media and concluded that news media litigants went
to great lengths to place their arguments in the context of broad free-speech rights
available to all speakers and not just journalists.26 Meanwhile, in the twenty-first century,
the lack of explicit distinguishable constitutional protections for journalists in the United
States has coincided with government, corporate and social pressures on journalism.
For example, Trump has popularized the phrase “fake news” to refer to any
reporting not to his liking. In Trump’s lexicon, a reference to “fake news” does not
necessarily mean the statements in question are untrue or out of touch with reality. In a
book published in June 2019,27 CNN reporter Jim Acosta, a frequent target of Trump and
Trump administration officials in White House press briefings and public campaign-style
rallies around the country, recounted an interaction that suggested Trump himself did not
realize the damage his fake news charges would ultimately cause to free press and
democracy. Acosta said that on February 16, 2017, after he had jousted with Trump in a
press briefing over the firing of National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and the
investigation of Russian interference in U.S. elections, he received a call from Trump
aide Hope Hicks:

25

Id. at 1055.

26

Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha: Supreme Court and

Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PENN. J. OF CONST. L. 375 (2009).
27

JIM ACOSTA, ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE: A DANGEROUS TIME TO TELL THE TRUTH IN AMERICA

(2019).
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“I wanted to let you know that I spoke with the President and he
wants you to know that he thought you were very professional today,”
Hicks said.
“He said, ‘Jim gets it,’” she added.
Hicks had offered insight into Trump’s thinking. When the
President called the press “fake news,” Hicks was essentially saying this
was just an expression, part of the act, something I apparently “get.” Other
Trump aides and adivsers confirmed this assessment.28

Acosta also recounted the multiple death threats he has received from Trump
supporters, and he also reported that Trump and his one-time advisor Stephen K. Bannon
devised the phrase “enemy of the people” to refer to the press but, disingenuously, the
Trump administration still maintains the phrase does not suggest journalists should be
attacked.29 Further, the phrases “fake news” and “enemy of the people” are now used by
populists, demagogues and autocrats around the world to undermine not just journalistic
critiques of public officials’ conduct but also to attack the very existence of objective
truth.30 Among those who have reportedly cribbed Trump’s pet phrases are Syrian

28

Jim Acosta, How Trump’s “Fake News” Rhetoric Has Gotten out of Control, CNN, June 11,

2019, https://www-m.cnn.com/2019/06/11/politics/enemy-of-the-people-jim-acosta-donaldtrump/index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F.
29

Id.

30

See Tom O’Connor, “Fake News!” Following Donald Trump, These Other World Leaders

Have Blamed The Media for Troubles At Home, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2018, available at
https://www.newsweek.com/fake-news-donald-trump-world-leaders-1165892.
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President Bashar al-Assad, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Russian President
Vladimir Putin.31
The relationship between Acosta and Trump officials reached a low point in
November 2018 when the White House revoked his press credential after Acosta and
Trump sparred during a press briefing.32 At one point, Acosta refused to give a White
House press briefing room microphone back to an aide who tried to take it from him.
CNN filed a lawsuit over the revocation, and a Trump-appointed U.S. District Court
judge in Washington, D.C., concluded that CNN and Acosta were likely to succeed on a
Fifth Amendment due-process challenge and thus a temporary restraining order against
the White House should be granted.33 Three days after the judge’s order, the White
House wrote Acosta a letter saying it was permanently restoring his press pass but also
imposing a new set of rules for conduct by journalists.34 The new rules allowed only one
question per journalist unless Trump or another official granted follow-ups; required

31

See id.

32

Brian Flood, Judge orders White House to return press pass to CNN’s Jim Acosta, FOX NEWS,

November 16, 2018, at https://www.foxnews.com/politics/judge-orders-white-house-returns-press-pass-tocnns-jim-acosta (accessed June 13, 2019).
33

Id.

34

See Bart Jansen & William Cummings, White House Backs Down From Fight With CNN,

Restores Press Credential for Reporter Jim Acosta, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2018, available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/11/19/jim-acosta-suspension-possiblypermanent/2053073002/.
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mandatory yielding of the floor, including returning the microphone, after one question;
and threatened revocation of a journalist’s press pass in case of failure to follow the
decorum rules.35
Because the White House gave in after the temporary restraining order, the
dispute over Acosta’s press pass never made it to a litigation stage in which the First
Amendment could be applied. Yet, it would seem even the new Trump administration
decorum rules for journalists pose constitutional problems. Still, the biggest impact of
Trump on journalism could be his larger “war on fact and truth itself.”36 Journalism in
the United States must fight for its credibility, move away from the strong tendency
toward false equivalency or balance, and refrain from focusing on every new
inflammatory Trump tweet.37
The rise of Facebook and other media platforms exploited by domestic and
foreign actors happens to have coincided with a decline in local journalism in the United
States. In a report titled “Beyond Fixing Facebook,” the journalism advocacy
organization Free Press recorded that the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported jobs at U.S.
newspapers declined from 375,000 in 2014 to 173,000 in 2016.38 The report further
documents that the University of North Carolina tracked the growing phenomenon of
“news deserts,” showing the United States lost 20% of its newspapers since 2004 and that

35

Id.

36

TIMOTHY ZICK, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TRUMP ERA 21 (2019).

37

Id. at 22.

38

Timothy Karr & Craig Aaron, Beyond Fixing Facebook, FREE PRESS, February 2019,

https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/2019-02/Beyond-Fixing-Facebook-Final_0.pdf.
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900 communities are without local news sources.39 The study concluded the decline in
local news is correlated with drops in civic engagement. It noted the power of socialnetwork algorithms to “gather people into like-minded groups and promote to them the
content that will generate the strongest reaction” and stated that these factors, combined
with advertising, create “an efficient machine for spreading misinformation and hate.”40
Free Press proposed to tax social-media advertising and fund a public interest media
endowment that would support local journalism and media literacy. Yet even those
measures might struggle to contain the deleterious effects of social media on U.S.
democracy and associated journalistic activities.
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, in the first half of 2018, testified both in the
U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. The half-trillion-dollar company had come
under fire for a scandal involving Cambridge Analytica, a political data firm that
surreptitiously accessed and sold information about Facebook users’ preferences and
friends.41 One of the individuals behind the company was Bannon, the alt-right leader
who served as a key advisor to the Trump campaign in 2016 and later to the Trump
administration in the White House. The effect of Cambridge Analytica’s exploitation of
fifty million accounts is still hard to pin down, but both the June 2016 vote by Britons to
leave the European Union and the November 2016 U.S. election of Trump seem to have

39

Id.

40

Id. at 7.

41

See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout

Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2018, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html.
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been influenced by the company’s activities. According to The Guardian, “Cambridge
Analytica’s own claims suggest that its tens of thousands of propaganda items were
viewed billions of times.”42
Further, Zuckerberg’s damage control efforts in 2018 also related to the fact that
U.S. criminal prosecutors led by special counsel Robert S. Mueller III in February 2018
indicted thirteen Russian individuals and three Russian organizations for interfering with
the U.S. presidential election in 2016.43 The indictment alleges that the Russian troll
farm known as the Internet Research Agency created false U.S. personas and spread
divisive propaganda on social media, including Facebook and Twitter, in an effort to get
Trump elected.44 The Internet Research Agency also bought political ads on Google,
posted videos on YouTube and promoted memes on Instagram that expertly trolled
Americans about divisive issues relating to race, religion and politics.45
In 2019, Reporters Without Borders ranked the United States 48th in its
international Press Freedom Index, a drastic drop of twenty-eight places in just nine

42

Tim Adams, Facebook’s Week of Shame: The Cambridge Analytica Fallout, THE GUARDIAN,

Mar. 24, 2018, available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/24/facebook-week-ofshame-data-breach-observer-revelations-zuckerberg-silence.
43

See U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Exposing

Russia’s Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements, at
https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/.
44

Id.

45

See Nicholas Thompson & Issie Lapowsky, How Russian Trolls Used Meme Warfare to Divide

America, WIRED, Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ira-propaganda-senate-report/.
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years, from 20th in 2010.46 Reporters Without Borders has compiled the report each year
since 2002, and the group analyzes data from 180 countries to compile its rankings.
Countries are ranked on a scale of zero to 100, with zero denoting the best conditions for
the press and 100 denoting the worst.47 These scores are based on data collected
regarding seven indicators.48 The countries and territories analyzed are then placed into
five categories describing the situation in that country or territory: good, satisfactory,
problematic, difficult or very serious.49

46

2019 World Press Freedom Index – A Cycle of Fear, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS,

https://rsf.org/en/2019-world-press-freedom-index-cycle-fear (accessed June 7, 2019).
47

The World Press Freedom Index, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, https://rsf.org/en/world-

press-freedom-index (accessed June 7, 2019).
48

See Reporters Without Borders, Detailed Methodology, RSF.ORG, https://rsf.org/en/detailed-

methodology (accessed June 7, 2019) (“Pluralism (Measures the degree to which opinions are represented
in the media). . . . Media Independence (Measures the degree to which the media are able to function
independently of sources of political, governmental, business, and religious power and influence). . . .
Environment and Self-Censorship (Analyses the environment in which news and information providers
operate). . . . Legislative Framework (Measures the impact of the legislative framework governing news
and information activities). . . . Transparency (Measures the transparency of the institutions and procedures
that affect the production of news and information). . . . Infrastructure (Measures the quality of the
infrastructure that supports the production of news and information). . . . [and] Abuses (Measures the level
of abuses and violence)”).
49

Id.
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In 2019, Reporters Without Borders found the situation in 37% of the countries
analyzed to be problematic and 40% to be difficult or very serious.50 This means that
only 24% of the 180 countries analyzed provide a good climate for the press.51 As such,
the increasingly precarious position of the press is a global issue, not just one observed in
the United States.52 In fact, in every report since 2013, Reporters Without Borders has
found a decrease in press freedom indicators in every region of the world except Asia,
which saw a slight uptick in its regional score from 42 to 41 over that period.53 However,
the report noted the “biggest deterioration in supposedly better regions,” including,
prominently, the United States.54
The United States’ decline over the last nine years is notable and alarming. At a
current score of 48, the United States dropped three points in just one year, falling for the
first time into the “problematic” category.55 The report points to a variety of reasons for
the increasingly hostile climate in the United States that caused this most recent hit to its
ranking to occur, and issuing the following, sobering conclusion:

Never before have U.S. journalists been subjected to so many death threats or
turned so often to private security firms for protection. Hatred of the media is now

50

2019 World Press Freedom Index – A Cycle of Fear, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS,

https://rsf.org/en/2019-world-press-freedom-index-cycle-fear.
51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.
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such that a man walked into the Capital Gazette newsroom in Annapolis,
Maryland, in June 2018 and opened fire, killing four journalists and one other
member of the newspaper’s staff.56

Reporters themselves are also raising concerns about the decline in protection that
they experience on the job and observe as professionals. Dan Rather, long-time CBS
news anchor with more than sixty years as a professional journalist,57 called the state of
the free press in America “a crisis greater than I have ever seen in my lifetime and
perhaps in any moment in this nation’s history.”58 Individual journalists have reported
fearing for their safety while on assignments that once would have presented little danger,
particularly while covering political rallies for Trump. CNN’s Acosta warned that the
angry rhetoric directed toward the press by Trump, both generally and at these events
specifically, could “result in somebody getting hurt.”59 Slate reporter Mark Stern reports
receiving regular death threats, many of which state the sentiment that “Trump wants

56

Id.

57

See Dan Rather Biography, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY,

https://www.notablebiographies.com/news/Ow-Sh/Rather-Dan.html (accessed June 7, 2019).
58

Dan Rather & Elliot Kirschner, Why a Free Press Matters, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 16, 2018,

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/why-a-free-press-matters/567676/.
59

Max Greenwood, CNN’s Acosta: I'm Worried Trump’s Rhetoric Toward Media “Will Result in

Somebody Getting Hurt,” THE HILL, July 31, 2018, https://thehill.com/homenews/media/399815-jimacosta-im-worried-trumps-rhetoric-toward-media-will-result-in-somebody.
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people like [him] gone.”60 News organizations have also publicly decried recent erosions
to press freedom. CNN issued a statement in late 2018 denouncing Trump’s retaliatory
revocation of Acosta’s press credentials, stating that such actions are “not only
dangerous, they are disturbingly un-American.”61 Freedom House aimed the following
suggestion at the United States:

Press freedom is one of the most fundamental pillars of American democracy, and
constitutional protections in the United States are stronger than in any country in
the world. Citizens could easily forget this amid media mudslinging and
incendiary commentary. Political leaders and teachers should reiterate the extent
to which we all benefit from professional journalists who hold those in power to
account.62

These circumstances point to the need for the United States to pay
increased attention to the legal and social protection of journalists in performing
their professional functions. Given the need for broad literacy and education
about the definition and role of journalism, as well as the traditional reticence of

60

Mark Joseph Stern, I am a Gay Jew in Trump’s America. And I am Afraid for My Life, SLATE,

Nov. 9, 2016, https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/11/i-am-a-gay-jew-in-trumps-america-and-i-amterrified.html.
61

Brian Stelter, White House Pulls CNN Reporter Jim Acosta’s Pass After Contentious News

Conference, CNN BUSINESS, Nov. 7, 2018], https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/media/trump-cnn-pressconference/index.html.
62

Id.
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U.S. jurists and journalists to give substantive meaning to the Press Clause, some
consideration of international human rights law is in order. The international law
freedom of journalism carries the potential to legally protect journalism in ways
that U.S. free-speech jurisprudence does not, including notably as it relates to
anti-journalism activities by private entities and individuals.

SCHOLARS ADVOCATE INDEPENDENT MEANING IN JOURNALISM PROTECTIONS
The events of recent years — including the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United v. FEC63 and the attacks on the press by politicians led by Trump — have some
U.S. scholars calling for an awakening of the First Amendment’s Press Clause.64 In
reality, scholars have been making this argument for decades.65 But now, jurists also

63

558 U.S. 310 (2010).

64

See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ.

ST. L.J., 1301, 1363-66 (2017); West, supra note 24, at 1068-70; Sonja R. West, The Bully and the Press,
TAKE CARE, Oct. 5, 2017, https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-bully-and-the-press (accessed October 20,
2018).
65

See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1982)

(noting the possibility for free press clause jurisprudence in the areas of confidential sources, access to
prisons and courtrooms, newsroom searches, and invasive discovery in defamation actions against
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have chimed in. Now-retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by three
other Justices, suggested in his partially dissenting opinion in Citizens United that the
Press Clause should have meaning independent of the Speech Clause. “[T]he press,”
Justice Stevens wrote, “might be able to claim special First Amendment status, and
therefore . . . some kinds of identity-based distinctions might be permissible after all.”66
The constitutional law scholar and former federal circuit judge Michael W.
McConnell agreed that Citizens United should have been decided as a Press Clause and
not a Speech Clause case because the anti-Hillary Clinton documentary in question fell
within the functional definition of press activity.67 If so, McConnell argued, some of the
problems following the opinion would be avoided because financial contributions in
politics — not part of the functional definition of the press — could be regulated even if
expenditures to express a message could not.
The renewed interest in the Press Clause suggests hope for journalism to solidify,
or re-establish, its societal role in the face of the stress brought to its economic model by
technological and societal changes68 and the threat to its legitimacy as an independent
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truth arbiter by the onslaught of autocratic attacks. Of course, even vigorous Press
Clause jurisprudence is not an answer to all the issues facing contemporary journalists,
but an awakened Press Clause could empower both institutional press actors and noninstitutional actors conducting press activities.69 An initial obstacle remains the longdiscussed thorny question of how to define the press. Here, international law scholarship
and jurisprudence provide some guidance, particularly in distinguishing an individual
journalism-function-based right from an institutional press or media right.
Noting that only 14% of the world’s population lives in countries rated as “free”
by Freedom House, one international-law scholar argued that news media are not merely
a means to an end but rather deserve human rights law protection in their own right.70
International human rights law recognizes the value of free expression in facilitating
other rights,71 but the focus on broad free expression rights and the facilitation of other
rights may have diluted attention needed for press freedom specifically. To combat the
decline of press freedom in developed and developing areas, according to one
international law researcher, scholars and advocates must insist on press freedom as a
stand-alone right with government oversight as its core function.72
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Scholars suggest one of the key reasons for a journalism right in international law
is that journalism serves a distinct role to prevent government abuse of power while
expression broadly defined has other goals. The general and broad free expression rights
may serve to facilitate individual self-fulfillment or autonomy;73 enable the search for
truth in the marketplace of ideas;74 protect minority voices;75 provide a societal safety
valve;76 and facilitate democratic decision-making.77 The press right could serve these
functions as well, at times, but they are not the focus of journalistic freedom under
international human rights law. In particular, journalism in international law plays
virtually no autonomy or self-fulfillment role. Instead, the primary purpose of freedom
of the press is to provide for a publicly interested government watchdog — the so-called
Fourth Estate whose investigations and publications would keep the branches of
government in check.78
Amid a flurry of contemporary scholarly discussions of international human rights
and freedom of expression,79 there are both professional practical guides to foreign and
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international media law80 as well as scholarly examinations of the protections afforded to
journalism specifically.81 European scholar Herdis Thorgeirsdottir discussed the need to
distinguish individual journalists and journalistic activities from institutional media, in
order to preserve the purposes of international-law protections for journalism:

Journalists, who must provide radical critique of society and its institutions,
censor themselves out of fear and timidity vis-à-vis corporate interests. Owners
and advertisers are in a position to use their economic advantage to manipulate
the information flow and opinion formation. Journalists operating within the
complex economic, social and political fabric of the market-based media are not
in a position to go against powerful interests. That would require personal
sacrifices without any rewards or guarantees. Self-censorship within the press is
as effective as any legal repression in earlier times in conscripting the press to the
establishment.82

Thorgeirsdóttir further analyzed jurisprudence from the European Court of
Human Rights suggesting that international law freedom of journalism could include
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protection against private actors as well as state actors.83 Thorgeirsdóttir calls this
“freedom within the media” and admits that it is not yet fully defined and established.84
Yet, the need for an individual rather than institutional freedom of journalism is clear.
Journalism, she says, “needs in particular to be on guard against the powerful alliance
that has been stepped up in recent decades between the elected authorities, which in
theory is ‘the government of the people, by the people, for the people,’ but has teamed
with corporate interests.”85
Similarly, the British journalism rights advocate Aidan White wrote that “the
growth of the open information landscape has created a new debate about what
distinguishes journalism from free expression. . . .”86 International law, White pointed
out, grants protections to individuals engaged in journalism that are not available to
others — non-discriminatory credentialing or accreditation for specific events or
locations, guarantees of pluralism, freedom of movement, and ability to shield
confidential sources in some instances.87 He recognized the growing breach between
journalists and their employers, singling out Rupert Murdoch’s media holdings as
particularly in need of “a rights-based corporate culture” in order to preserve both
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journalism and international human rights law standards.88 In the United States, White
said, Fox News has “abandoned journalistic norms on behalf of its political allies,
developing a curious revenue model based upon populist, biased and ‘attack dog’
journalism.”89
Thorgeirsdóttir and White agree the international law freedom of journalism
carries with it responsibilities. This is true generally of freedom of expression under
Article 19, which calls them “special duties and responsibilities”90 that may justify some
regulation as long as the regulation passes muster under a necessity and proportionality
test described in detail later in this article. White, who founded the Ethical Journalism
Network in 2012 after twenty-five years of building the International Federation of
Journalists in 126 countries, puts the responsibility for monitoring performance of
journalistic duties and responsibilities squarely on journalists and their associations.91 He
notes, however, some efforts at “discreet use of law to underpin and promote journalism
as a public good.”92 Oster has made an extensive argument for media freedom as a standalone human right but he does not separate journalists from their owners.93 Significantly,
Oster points out that international human rights law carries with it an obligation for
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nations to protect human rights, such as for journalism, from impairment by private
entities and individuals in some cases.94
In its commentaries and adjudications on ICCPR Article 19,95 the Human Rights
Committee provides a comprehensive and vibrant view of the role of journalism under
international human rights law. An understanding of how the Human Rights Committee
already has defined the function of journalism suggests that one of the most frequently
discussed obstacles to an individual journalism right with independent legal meaning is
not insurmountable.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTIONS FOR JOURNALISM
Although not binding international law, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights establishes lofty aspirations for global protection of freedom of expression. In that
Declaration, the United Nations General Assembly stated, “Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.”96 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
Article 19, expanded the UDHR’s discussion of media to emphasize they include
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communications made “orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media….”97
ICCPR Article 19 clarifies, however, that restrictions may be imposed on free
expression in case of countervailing interests. The justification given for these
restrictions is that the right to freedom of expression carries “special duties and
responsibilities.”98 Several of the interests implicate journalism. First, the free
expression right may be restricted if a country’s laws specify that the restriction is
necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others. Second, the right to free
expression may be restricted for reasons of national security and public order, health or
morals. The restrictions must be explicitly stated in law and justified as necessary in a
democratic society. This test of proportionality established in Article 19 measures the
legality of a government restriction on free expression by how well the government
regulation fits the need for it.
Although Article 19 does not specifically mention journalism within the larger
free expression landscape,99 the principal soft-law commentary by the Human Rights
Committee establishes the parameters of the proportionality test as applied to journalism
in international law. The Committee in its General Comment 34, released in 2011,
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engaged in extensive analysis of the contours of the journalism right in ICCPR Article
19.100 General Comment 34 singles out journalism among other forms of free expression
because it enables a broad range of opinion and expression rights,101 constitutes a
cornerstone of democracy, and ensures that governments do not infringe (or allow others
to infringe) on other fundamental human rights in ICCPR.102 General Comment 34
envisions an independent and uncensored press that is protected in its ability to gather
news and information so that it may inform the public on government activities and other
issues of public importance.103
As the treaty implementation body of ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee is
both reactive and proactive. The Committee, which is made up of eighteen international
human rights law experts who each serve four-year terms, monitors compliance with
ICCPR both by hearing individual adjudications charging violations of the treaty
provisions and by publishing commentaries — in the form of General Comments and
Concluding Observations — defining standards and providing guidance to nations that
are parties to ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 34, has
concluded the right to free expression is so important that it may not be subject to
reservations by nations that join ICCPR, meaning that all parties to the treaty accept free
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expression as a fundamental right that must be protected and respected. Further, General
Comment 34 says no derogations, or suspensions of rights in case of emergency, are
allowed in the case of free expression. Finally, Article 19 is not subject to countries’
subjective interpretations, known as margin of appreciation.104
Distinguishing freedom of journalism from other forms of free expression is one
of the hallmarks of international law. Although the United States First Amendment has
been held not to distinguish free press from free speech, Article 19 of ICCPR and other
international law provisions take a different approach. By attempting to define the role of
free journalism within the larger freedom of expression landscape, and by applying the
proportionality test with full consideration for the unique contribution to society of
journalism, international law gives journalism an opportunity to stand apart from other
forms of expression. The particular functions and definition of freedom of journalism
under international law can be categorized in four ways.

Freedom of Journalism Is Narrower But Stronger Than Freedom of
Expression Under the Proportionality Test

While international law cannot anticipate every situation in which a government
entity could attempt to regulate journalism, the Human Rights Committee has given
extensive guidelines for applying the proportionality test in case of attempted government
restrictions on journalism. The government’s interest in secrecy and efficiency (or other
goals) cannot justify refusal to disclose to journalists any government-held documents
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and information that are in the public interest.105 The role of journalism is particularly
important, even essential, in the context of political campaigns, and therefore the
proportionality test would not allow restriction of journalistic coverage of candidates and
issues in that setting.106 Further, the Committee asserted, the proportionality test would
not allow, under any circumstance, a physical attack, arbitrary arrest, torture, threat to life
or murder of a journalist merely for doing journalism.107 Although describing the
freedom of journalism in broad language, the United Nations Special Rapporteur who
investigated the murder of Khashoggi affirmed, “There can hardly be a greater
‘interference’ with freedom of opinion and expression than killing a journalist or
disappearing him in an apparent attempt to silence him.”108
Although national security is one of the potential justifications for regulating free
expression, the proportionality test of Article 19(3) does not permit withholding or
suppressing information of legitimate public interest if that information does not actually
harm national security. This section of General Comment 34 explicitly forbids
prosecution of journalists under treason, official secrets, sedition or other laws merely for
publishing government information that does not actually harm national security.109 The
proportionality test also accounts for the high value placed on journalistic scrutiny of
public figures and public officials. General Comment 34 notes that the Human Rights
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Committee found Angola in violation of ICCPR Article 19 for jailing a journalist named
Rafael Marques de Morais for making good-faith accusations, based on his investigative
reporting, of corruption by the Angolan president and the president’s daughter.110 In
referencing that case, the Committee in General Comment 34 reiterated that the
proportionality test requires that:

[R]estrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; they
must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function;
they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected. . . . The principle of
proportionality has to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions
but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law. . . . The
principle of proportionality must also take account of the form of expression at
issue as well as the means of its dissemination.111

The international law proportionality test, then, treats journalism differently —
and with more protection — than other forms of free expression.112 Public order, the
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Committee wrote, might justify certain restrictions on speech and even the pursuit of
contempt of court proceedings, but as suggested already, public order could not be used
as a pretense to censor or punish journalistic scrutiny of public officials’ conduct while in
office.113 Racial hate speech may be curtailed but good-faith investigative journalism
about public officials, even if unknowingly false, should not be.114 The Committee has
turned back attempts by government officials in nations that have joined ICCPR to
prevent opposition candidates from talking with journalists and to cut off public access to
news during election periods.115 Legitimate journalistic scrutiny of public officials is
protected under Article 19 regardless of whether those government officials feel upset,
embarrassed or defamed.116 A government ban on a specific newspaper, or governmentimposed onerous licensing conditions on a broadcast news organization, would not be
compatible with Article 19.117 In fact, the Committee went so far as to say penalizing a
journalist solely for criticizing the government “can never be considered to be a
necessary restriction.”118
The Committee’s General Comment 34 provides further guidance about
government regulation of journalism that would not pass the proportionality test. Use of
government subsidies and advertisement to control news content is not justifiable.119
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Favoring one news publication over another in accessing news is not proportional to a
legitimate societal need, either.120 Government licensing of journalists is incompatible
with Article 19, particularly in light of the fact that the function of journalism can be
filled at any given time by a variety of people, regardless of whether they are considered
institutionally affiliated professional journalists.121 Accrediting journalists for access to
specific events or locations may be justifiable but not if done in a subjective way to favor
or disfavor certain journalists based on their professional status or past published or
broadcast content.122 Article 19 would rarely approve of a journalist being restricted to
travel.123 Furthermore, Article 19 of ICCPR encompasses a qualified journalistic
privilege in the case of confidential news sources.124 News coverage of terrorists and
their activities plays an important public function and should not be restricted.125
In summary, international law affords near-absolute protection to the function of
journalism — a good-faith effort to discover and disseminate truth, especially about
matters of public interest such as elections, politics and the performance of public
officials. Of course, even countries that have signed and ratified ICCPR do not always
comply. In those cases, the Human Rights Committee, the body charged with
implementing ICCPR, has found nations to be out of compliance with Article 19 in
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individual instances of litigation before the Committee as well as in broader Concluding
Observations to a periodic country reporting and review process. In applying the
proportionality test, the Committee rarely finds government restriction of journalism to
be justified even though a variety of other expressive activities have been allowed to be
regulated. The international-law right to free journalism is narrower but closer to
absolute than the general right to free expression.

Freedom of Journalism Applies to Individuals Who Act Independently and in
Good Faith to Seek and Disseminate Truth in the Public Interest
The UN Human Rights Committee went to great lengths in 2013 to outline the
role of independent journalism to seek and disseminate truth in the public interest.
Despite lack of jurisdiction to reach a conclusion, the Committee nonetheless considered
journalism rights important enough to write a long opinion in a case alleging violations
committed by Kazakhstan against a journalist named Almas Kusherbaev.126 Kazakhstan
had not endorsed the individual complaints mechanism in the Optional Protocol to
ICCPR at the time the events occurred, and thus the Committee felt it was precluded from
reaching a conclusion of violation by Kazakhstan. Still, the Committee seized the
opportunity to discuss the role of journalism in discovering and disseminating truth.127
The journalist worked at an independent newspaper in Almaty called Raszhargan, which
published an article in 2008 about the place of Kazakhstan in the global economy in light
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of the government’s decision to ban grain exports. In particular, the article focused on a
member of the country’s parliament named Romin Madinov.128
Although Madinov claimed the article defamed him, and he ultimately succeeded
in obtaining a judgment of approximately $200,000 (US) against Kusherbaev, the Human
Rights Committee expounded at length on the arguments in favor of free journalism. The
Committee asserted:

International courts have emphasized that the duty of the press goes beyond mere
reporting of facts; its duty is to interpret facts and events in order to inform the
public and contribute to the discussion of matters of public importance. There is
very little scope for restrictions on political debate.129

The Committee further asserted that both the public and private or business
interests of a public official are subject to a higher level of public and journalistic
scrutiny than would be the case with a private individual.130 Given Kazakhstan’s status
as a major grain producer, the Committee said there was great public interest in the
country’s efforts to deal with complex economic problems. The role of a member of
parliament in that environment was subject not only to the freedom of a journalist to
report but became part of the journalist’s duty to report.131
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In the Kazakhstan case, one of the key issues left unresolved by the Committee
dealt with the protection afforded to a journalist who acted independently and in good
faith to get the truth but may have been unable, ultimately, to prove the truth of his or her
assertions. The Committee repeated, without necessarily endorsing, the arguments by the
journalist based on a European Court of Human Rights decision “that it would be
unacceptable for a journalist to be debarred from expressing critical value judgments
unless he or she could prove their truth.”132
In a case from Uzbekistan, the Committee limited somewhat the protection for
erroneous journalism by concluding that a journalist’s rights had not been violated by a
judgment of defamation based on accusations of corruption for which the complainant
university professor had been acquitted in criminal court.133 That case, then, stands for
the proposition that Article 19 does not protect journalists in the case of demonstrably
false statements about private citizens. Yet, in other cases the Human Rights Committee
has included false statements, if made in good-faith belief in their truth, within the ambit
of free-journalism protections. This is particularly true when the statements concern
public officials.
The Committee gave latitude to a journalist using sarcasm when alleging
wrongdoing by a leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia.134 The Committee found a
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violation of Article 19 where the national courts convicted the journalist, Zeljko
Bodrožić, of criminal insult while taking literally his exaggerated and sarcastic
commentary.135 Even the national courts had acknowledged that to the extent the
journalist spoke factually, his statements were true and correct.136
Meanwhile, the Committee held Angola violated the Article 19 rights of journalist
Rafael Marques de Morais when government officials jailed him for forty days without
informing him of any formal criminal charges against him.137 The journalist was tried
and convicted of defamation and slander for his news articles alleging corruption by the
Angolan president, José Eduardo dos Santos. The conviction was improper under
international law, according to the UN Human Rights Committee. In their decision,
Committee members emphasized that “a free and uncensored press or other media” is of
“paramount importance . . . in a democratic society.”138 The Committee further noted the
country’s president “is subject to criticism and opposition” and the Angolan courts
wrongly did not allow the journalist to assert truth as a defense to the libel charge.139

Freedom of Journalism Prioritizes a Government Watchdog Role With Core
Values of Justice and Civic Virtue
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International law protections for freedom of journalism have at their core the role
of journalism to monitor government use of official power and seek to achieve justice and
civic virtue in society. International human rights law views journalism as entitled to
righteous indignation in the face of public officials who seek to advance their own selfish
agendas, have conflicts of interest and engage in hypocrisy.140 Agnes Callamard, the
U.N. Special Rapporteur investigating the death of Khashoggi, decried not only the
murder of Khashoggi and other journalists by government authorities but also the
associated culture of impunity.141 Given the tendency of rogue governments who harm
journalists to insulate themselves from accountability, Callamard emphasized the need
for slain journalists to be memorialized with statues, street names, endowed funds,
commemoration days and lecture series in order to focus public attention on preventing
future officials from harming journalists even when those journalists are critical of
officials’ conduct.142
Large portions of Callamard’s 99-page, 513-paragraph report about the death of
Khashoggi are dedicated to the protection of journalism as a check on government abuse
of official power. Summarizing, Callamard wrote:

As highlighted throughout this report, before he was executed, Mr. Khashoggi had
been subjected to silencing and censorship, with his large number of followers
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and his articles for the Washington Post perceived [by the Saudi government] as
unacceptable threats. There is no more fitting legacy than to ensure that others
like him are both protected and supported in their efforts to counter incitement,
hatred and threat, both on-line and off-line.143

As stated previously, General Comment 34 makes abundantly clear that no
government could ever show a necessity under Article 19 to attack, torture or kill a
journalist based on that person’s journalistic work even if highly critical, whether true or
false, of a government official or leader.144 Although Saudi Arabia is not party to
ICCPR, the actions by agents of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to kill and
dismember Khashoggi in Istanbul are obviously not in line with the standard of Article
19. The protection of journalism’s watchdog role extends well beyond the extreme acts
of torture and murder in the case of Khashoggi. Government action against journalists
performing their watchdog role are virtually never appropriate under the proportionality
test even if those regulations are non-violent, for example censorship or incarceration.145
In addition to their government watchdog function, journalists play an educational
and cultural role in society that merits a high level of protection from government
interference under the proportionality test. The Committee concluded that Uzbekistan
violated the Article 19 rights of journalists and readers of a Tajik-language newspaper
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called Oina.146 The newspaper was repeatedly shut down by government officials and
forced to re-register with the government multiple times, which the Committee found
inappropriate in light of the newspaper’s societal contributions:

“Oina” published articles containing educational and other materials for Tajiklanguage students and young persons, to assist in their education, to promote a
spirit of tolerance and a respect for human values, and to assist in their intellectual
and cultural development. In addition to publishing reports on events and matters
of cultural interest to this readership (including interviews with prominent Tajik
personalities), the newspaper published samples of students’ work. It also
detailed particular difficulties facing the continued provision of education to Tajik
youth in their own language, including shortages of Tajik-language textbooks,
low wages for teachers and the forced opening of classes using Uzbek as the
language of instruction in some schools where Tajik had previously been the only
language of instruction.147

The Human Rights Committee also concluded, in a case from Canada, that
journalists who fail to live up to the high ideals of their profession, including nondiscrimination against peers on the basis of content or opinion, may not be entitled to
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deference and protection for their activities.148 A group of journalists who formed the
Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery had control over media passes to report on
activities of the Canadian Parliament and gain full access to its facilities. The Press
Gallery had been allowed by the Speaker of the House of Commons to determine who
qualified as a journalist entitled to full membership and thus accreditation. Yet the Press
Gallery denied repeated applications for membership by Robert G. Gauthier, publisher of
the National Capital News. Gauthier asserted that the Press Gallery engaged in
favoritism, coercion and even blackmail. By denying Gauthier membership, the Press
Gallery prevented him from receiving the benefits enjoyed by other journalists, including
free telephones, services of government staff, access to press conferences, office space,
access to press releases and government itineraries, parking, permission to take notes in
Parliament, and use of the Library of Parliament.149
The Canadian government and the Press Gallery, in turn, argued that Gauthier
could still access the proceedings of Parliament like any regular citizen, including on
broadcast television and the Internet. Transcripts of proceedings were made available in
print form within a day. However, the Committee concluded these methods of public
access were not sufficient because Gauthier was treated differently by the government
and the Press Gallery than other journalists.150 To the extent journalists themselves have
control over accreditation of journalists, the Committee said, decisions must be made in a
non-discriminatory way. Because the government’s abdication to the Press Gallery could
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result in arbitrary exclusions, the Committee said, the scheme was not necessary and
proportional to the government’s interest in controlling access by journalists to
Parliament. The Committee admonished Canada and the Press Gallery in the future to
make their processes “specific, fair and reasonable, and their application should be
transparent.”151
In another case from Canada, the Committee declined to grant relief to a man
named Ernst Zundel who claimed his Article 19 rights were violated by virtue of being
denied Canadian citizenship, detained and threatened with deportation in part because of
his extensive public Holocaust denial in various forms of news media.152 The Committee
ultimately concluded that Zundel had failed to exhaust remedies under the Canadian
Charter and thus the claim under ICCPR was inadmissible.153 Although the Committee
did not reach a conclusion on the merits, Zundel’s claims of journalistic protection under
Article 19 seem extremely unlikely in light of Article 20’s prohibition on religious and
racist hate speech.154 The proportionality test would not likely condemn Canada for
punishing and even deporting Zundel for, among other things, intentional false statements
denying the historical reality of the Holocaust.
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Freedom of Journalism Includes the Right and Responsibility to Protect Itself
and Other Fundamental Human Rights
The adjudications and commentaries of the Human Rights Committee have
emphasized the role of journalism in facilitating the fulfillment of human rights.155 In
order to complete that objective, journalists must stand up for their own distinct and
individual journalism rights. In 2014, the Committee held that Belarus had violated the
Article 19 right of a journalist named Marina Koktish by denying her accreditation to
report on the House of Representatives within the National Assembly.156 Koktish, a
reporter for the independent newspaper Narodnaya Volya, asserted the denial stemmed
from her newspaper’s identity as the only independent, non-state-owned, publication
attempting to report on the House of Representatives. Although the government had
asserted her security clearance was justifiably denied, officials failed to provide any
substantiation and so the Human Right Committee rejected that rationale.157
The Committee placed great importance on the fact that Koktish’s rejected
accreditation would result in her being unable to report on the actions of elected officials,
which in turn would prevent the newspaper’s readers from understanding how their own
interests were being served by their representatives.158 The Human Rights Committee
concluded that journalists’ right to access information about public affairs could not be
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allowed to be subverted by the political interests or preferences of the political party in
power: “The free press and other media can therefore access information about the
activities of elected bodies and their members and are able to comment on public issues
without censorship or restraint and inform public opinion.”159 In this case, it was
apparent the denial of Koktish’s accreditation was not proportional to a state interest in
national security or any other permissible objective. The Committee mandated that
Belarus publish the Committee’s opinion widely and report within 180 days on the
actions taken to resolve the human rights violation.160
In her report on Khashoggi’s killing, Callamard noted that Khashoggi had been a
zealous advocate for democracy and truth in the face of widespread state propaganda, and
he ardently fought online hate speech.161 Callamard analyzed the relationships among
human rights — in the case of Khashoggi, the violation of his right to conduct journalistic
activities was inextricably tied to the violation of his right to be free of privacy violations
through surveillance and harassment as well as the violation of his right to life.162 The
Human Rights Committee noted freedom of expression promotes transparency and
accountability that are necessary for realization of all human rights, and free expression is
closely tied to rights such as freedom of association and assembly as well as the right to
vote.163
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A country’s obligation under international human rights law includes the duty to
respect, protect and fulfill the realization of human rights.164 This means nations must
not only refrain from violating human rights themselves but also protect individual
human rights from violations by other nations and even private entities or private
individuals. Nations must also proactively seek to accomplish full realization of human
rights.165 Callamard concluded the United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are all
responsible to investigate Khashoggi’s death, prosecute those involved and take measure
to ensure such an extrajudicial killing of a journalist will not happen again.166 Those
countries’ duties — especially Saudi Arabia because of the cover-up associated with
Khashoggi’s killing — could also extend to taking action to prevent human rights abuses
by private companies and individuals such as public relations firms, lobbyists and
government-contracted journalists.167 Callamard also fired a shot across the bow of
Facebook and other social media and analytics companies that have allowed their
services to be used for propaganda purposes:

Do such companies bear some responsibility for the use made of their services,
such as their strategic, technical and communications analyses or well-placed

164

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, International Human Rights

Law, at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx (accessed January 9,
2020).
165

Id.

166

Khashoggi Report, supra note 1 at ¶¶ 399-407.

167

Id. at ¶¶ 450-451.

45

articles and quotes? . . . . In an era where propaganda and disinformation are
denounced as risks to democracy and human rights, including to the right to
freedom of expression, such questions ought to be seriously considered. . . . The
many companies around the world that are contracted to monitor negative
narratives and respond to them, by creating and spreading positive stories,
developing national and global communication and political lobbying strategies,
ought to determine whether their functions and outputs could be used to violate
human rights. . . . They also ought to assess whether their products may be used to
cover up human rights violations. Finally, the Special Rapporteur believes that
companies should consider speaking up in the face of systematic or continuous
human rights abuse.168

More than a year after the killing of Khashoggi, a lawful U.S. resident, the United
States government had made little headway with Saudi Arabia in terms of finding out
what happened and why. Although the Trump administration claimed to be pressuring
the Saudi government for answers,169 there have been no real consequences other than a
mostly secret prosecution by Saudi Arabia resulting in five death sentences but not
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conclusively answering the question of who ordered Khashoggi’s death and why.170 In
fact, Trump’s energy secretary, Rick Perry, reportedly approved transfer of nuclear
technology secrets to Saudi Arabia two times even after the killing of Khashoggi, but
those facts did not come to light until June 2019.171 Trump’s son-in-law and advisor
Jared Kushner reportedly has a close relationship with Mohammed bin Salman and still
refuses to acknowledge the CIA’s conclusion that the Crown Prince ordered Khashoggi’s
murder.172 Until the facts are all discovered and disseminated, Khashoggi’s killing
remains an affront to the Article 19 rights of free journalism everywhere.173

CONCLUSION
The killing of Khashoggi has brought attention to global attacks on journalism as
well as the international law protections for freedom of journalism. That individual
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freedom increasingly should be seen as distinct from an institutional media or press right,
in part because media organizations may not be sufficiently independent from economic
and political perspectives. The freedom of journalism should be further developed in
international law and commentary. At this point, the freedom involves certain specific
journalistic rights including source confidentiality, non-discriminatory credentialing or
accreditation and unrestricted movement within and across national borders. Freedom of
journalism is relatively narrow and applied to individuals who complete journalistic
functions regardless of whether they hold institutional media jobs. Journalism is a high
priority for protection under the test of proportionality that measures whether government
regulation is permissible when it impairs fundamental human rights.
Freedom of journalism does not have a state-action requirement in order for legal
impairment or infringement to occur. The right may require national governments to
accept responsibility for controlling the conduct of private entities and individuals in
some cases. The core of freedom of journalism is independent activity to seek and
disseminate truth on matters of public interest, and it primarily serves a government
watchdog role with justice and civic virtue as central values. The freedom to conduct
journalism supersedes virtually all government interests in regulation in part because of
journalism’s role in promoting the transparency and accountability necessary for the
realization of all human rights.
Like other nations that have signed and ratified ICCPR, the United States has
bound itself to the international law understanding of journalistic freedom as discussed in
this article. However, the United States has not adopted the Optional Protocol that would
allow individual complaints against the United States to be heard by the UN Human
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Rights Committee. Effectively, then, the United States has insulated itself from a
primary method of enforcement of the treaty. Still, if the United States government is to
be taken at its word, the principles and international law standards of Article 19 as
interpreted by General Comment 34 should be respected, protected and fulfilled. Doing
so could promote public understanding and support, combat the Trump administration’s
assaults and force private corporations to confront their accountability for propaganda,
partisanship and other practices harmful to freedom of journalism.
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